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Abstract
Over recent decades, three North African 
economies – Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt 
– have been regional pioneers in adopting 
integration in global value chains as a path 
to economic development and trans-
formation. Reflecting their geographical 
proximity to Europe, preferential access 
to the EU market, and large wage gap 
between them and European economies, 
each have emerged as important locations 
for labour-intensive activities in European 
value chains in the garments, electronics 
and automotive sectors. Reflecting the 
range of incentives offered, the coastal 
areas in the three economies witnessed 
a relatively large influx of foreign and 
domestic investment. As a result, the 
three economies experienced import-
ant economic transformation processes 
with an increase in their manufacturing 
sectors, manufacturing jobs and manu-
factured exports. Notwithstanding this 
relative success, the reliance on low-cost 
labour as a source of competitive advan-
tage, in addition to these economies and 
their firms’ weak position in European 
value chains, has limited the wider eco-
nomic and social benefits of this growth 
and also left these countries in a struc-
turally fragile position vis-à-vis shifts in 
the European market. This fragility was 
illustrated in recent years following the 
global economic crisis and the European 
debt crisis on one hand, and the protest 
movements of the Arab Spring on the 
other. In recent years, the exhaustion of 
this low-cost platform model has driven 
a divergence in the three economies with 
Morocco succeeding in upgrading its 
position in a number of European value 
chains while Egypt and Tunisia have 
been forced to maintain competitiveness 
though successive currency devaluations.
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Introduction
Non-oil economies in the Middle East and North Africa have long faced serious economic 
development challenges. Contrary to some of their resource-rich neighbours in the region, 
non-oil states lack the resources to enjoy high levels of income and to build relatively 
stable rentier-based political regimes.1 As a result, building economic models that can 
achieve economic growth, create jobs and enable broader social development has always 
been a fundamental challenge facing their ruling elites as their political survival partially 
depends on the ability to deliver such outcomes. 
This working paper focuses on three North African economies that, to different extents, 
fit this analysis: Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Despite having varying degrees of natural 
resources (in some cases substantial amounts), the economies of those countries cannot 
survive through the exports of natural resources and their political elites are not in a posi-
tion to build a political economy based solely on these resources. Instead they face the 
constant challenge of delivering economic and social outcomes to help maintain their 
political power. 
The strategy adopted in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco has experienced important shifts 
throughout the twentieth century and the first two decades of the twenty-first century. 
Following independence from France and Britain, the three countries adopted state-led 
models of development, similar to many other newly independent states at the time. 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, however, reflecting broader global shifts 
related to the end of the Cold War and the dominance of more liberal economic think-
ing, these North African economies moved toward a liberal economic policy that focused 
on trade liberalisation and on promoting export-oriented industrialisation. Benefitting 
from proximity to the EU, historical business and trade linkages with European countries 
such as France, Spain and Italy, and preferential market access to the European market 
through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the three North African economies 
experienced a degree of growth in manufactured exports. As a result of their ability to 
integrate into EU-focused production networks, they experienced an increase in exports 
of labour-intensive industries such as apparel and electronics, with most of the produc-
tion concentrated in special economic zones that are located in their respective coastal 
regions, which enable quick access to Europe. 
Despite the relative success of this export-based economic model in boosting manu-
factured exports, the ability to build sustainable development through integration with 
EU-dominated global production networks has been limited. This paper argues that as a 
result of the three economies’ high dependency on the EU, and their weak position within 
European-oriented production networks, they are in a structurally fragile position that 
undermines the sustainability of their economic model. These challenges were important 
factors in exacerbating economic and social problems that Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
experienced towards the end of the 2000s, subsequently contributing to their respective 
protest movements, known as the Arab Spring. 
1   Rolf Schwarz, ‘The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier states, eco-
nomic reform, and democratization’, Review of International Political Economy 15/4 (2018), pp. 599–621.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section two discusses the rise of export-ori-
ented development as the dominant political economic regime in Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco; section three examines the structural fragility of these economies in relation to 
their position in EU-dominated global production networks; and section four discusses 
the trends that followed the Arab Spring and the search for alternative economic models 
in the region. 
Export-Oriented Industrialisation and Integration in European Produc-
tion Networks
Despite important differences, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia all gained independence with 
economic structures and linkages that were not very different from the colonial core-pe-
riphery international division of labour. Despite some level of manufacturing and earlier 
efforts to industrialise,2 the three countries were largely exporters of raw materials and 
agricultural products to the European market and importers of manufactured goods. 
European capital, and Europeans, were key in the economies of the three countries in 
finance, trade, agriculture, services and other sectors. 
State-led Development in North Africa 
Following independence, the three countries adopted strategies inspired by the state-
led developmental approach, which was popular among newly independent states in the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s. These strategies combined various policies, including the nation-
alisation of private firms, an emphasis on the role of the state in setting up state-owned 
enterprises, import substitution trade policies and capital controls, as well as the role of 
development banks in directing investments. The nature of these policies, the political 
conditions under which they were implemented, and their duration, however, differed in 
each context. We now provide a very brief overview for each of the three cases. 
Tunisia 
Following independence in 1956, Tunisian politics was dominated by the Neo-Destour 
party which led the independence movement from France. The Neo-Destour party 
brought different elements of Tunisian society into the struggle for independence, namely 
the bourgeoisie and the organised labour movement; particularly the main trade union, 
known as the Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT). At the helm of Tuni-
sian politics for the decades following independence was President Habib Bourguiba, in 
office from independence until 1987. Throughout this period, Tunisian economic policy 
shifted substantially with Bourguiba adjusting and reacting to domestic and international 
changes.3 The state elite initially adopted a strategy that combined import substitution 
with the promotion of the private sector through favourable laws, tax incentives and credit 
2   Eric Davis, Challenging Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920–1941 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Eva Bellin, ‘Tunisian industrialists and the state’, in I. W. Zartman 
(ed.), Tunisia: The Political Economy of Reform (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1991), pp. 45–66. 
3   Emma Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 
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mechanisms.4 Nonetheless, the limited success of this policy led to a more state-led devel-
opment approach especially in the period from 1961 to 1969 when Ahmed Ben Salah, who 
was previously the general secretary of the UGTT, was appointed as a Minister of Planning 
and Minister of Finance and given the task of developing a plan for the Tunisian econ-
omy.5 In 1962, Tunisia adopted its first economic plan which aimed to adopt a state-led 
development model through the increasing role of cooperatives and through state-owned 
enterprises.6 This programme of state-led development was, however, abandoned within 
a few years due to internal opposition from important elements of the Tunisian elite 
and external opposition to Ben Salah’s efforts to create agricultural cooperatives on land 
obtained, purchased or confiscated, from former French colonists.7 Ben Salah’s dismissal 
in 1969 effectively ended the Tunisian state-led development experience. 
Morocco 
Following independence from France in 1956, Moroccan politics was dominated by 
competition between the two political actors who played a key role in the struggle for 
independence: King Mohammed V and the Istiqlal Party. The Istiqlal Party brought a 
broad range of social groups into the independence struggle but was divided econom-
ically between a more radical left-wing faction supported by trade unions and student 
organisations, and another more economically conservative wing.8 King Mohammed V, 
on the other hand, emerged as a prominent national figure, especially after his return 
from exile by the French. Political instability in Morocco continued for decades with 
conflicts between the royal Palace, the political parties, the military and the security 
apparatus. This led to a number of major constitutional changes in the country in the 
decades following independence.9 
Economic policy in Morocco remained relatively liberal with less adoption of state-led 
development models. Yet at certain points the influence of state-led industrialisation 
strategies was evident. In 1958, following a series of political crises and failure to form 
a government, a politician from the left wing of the Istiqlal Party, Abdallah Ibrahim, was 
appointed by King Mohammed V as Prime Minister. Ibrahim adopted an ambitious eco-
nomic plan that aimed to limit Morocco’s dependency on the French economy, in terms of 
trade and capital, and resolved to foster industrialisation. These principles were reflected 
in the economic transition plan of 1958 (Plan biennal d’équipement 1958–1959) which 
aimed to rupture economic relations with the former colonial power and to promote 
4   Bellin, ‘Tunisian Industrialists and the State’, pp. 45–66.
5   Jeffrey Cason and Gregory White, ‘The State as Naïve Entrepreneur: The political economy of export 
promotion in Brazil and Tunisia’, Policy Studies Journal 26/1 (1998), pp. 46–68. 
6   Gregory White, A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco: On the Outside of Europe 
Looking In (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014).
7   Cason and White, ‘The State as Naïve Entrepreneur’; Dirk Vandewalle, ‘From the New State to the New 
Era: Toward a second republic in Tunisia’, Middle East Journal 42/4, (1988), pp. 602–20.
8   Richard Pennell, Morocco Since 1830: A History (London: Hurst, 2000).
9   Lise Storm, Democratization in Morocco: The Political Elite and Struggles for Power in the Post-Indepen-
dence State (London: Routledge, 2007).
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industrialisation and the processing of raw materials.10 The Bureau d’Etudes et de Partic-
ipations Industrielles (BEPI) was created with a mandate to develop Moroccan industry 
through setting-up or contributing to manufacturing firms in areas where private enter-
prises had not entered, sometimes through partnerships with foreign firms, and a national 
economic development bank was also established.11 
The Ibrahim government, and its broader economic programme, was, however, short-lived 
and Ibrahim was dismissed in 1960. In subsequent decades, the Moroccan state maintained 
an important economic role, partially as a result of its control of phosphate exports in 
which Morocco was the leading world supplier. In the 1970s, the state expanded its eco-
nomic role through the process of Morrocanisation through which Moroccan ownership 
of a large number of firms was required.12 Throughout this process, and despite signing an 
association agreement and a cooperation accord with the EU, the Moroccan state main-
tained a high degree of control over external trade.13 This situation began to change in the 
early 1980s when a collapse in phosphate prices, amongst other factors, led to the adoption 
of trade liberalisation in Morocco as part of broader process of structural adjustment.14
Egypt 
Compared to Morocco and Tunisia, Egypt adopted a far stronger state-led development 
strategy with the country becoming the prototype of ‘Arab socialism’ in the 1950s and 
1960s, during the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser.15 Contrary to Tunisia and Morocco, where 
the private sector maintained a strong economic role throughout the economic shifts, the 
role of the private sector in the Egyptian economy in the early 1960s was smaller as the 
Egyptian state adopted a large-scale nationalisation programme. 
While elements of import-substitution industrialisation began earlier, these policies 
became part of a broader state-led development strategy following the 1952 military take-
over by the Free Officers Movement.16 Over subsequent years, the new Egyptian regime 
adopted a comprehensive strategy for economic change that began with land reforms and 
expanded into a broader nationalisation programme. The latter included the Suez Canal 
and a large part of private and foreign enterprises in Egypt such as banks, insurance com-
10   Alain Piveteau, Khadija Askour and Hanane Touzani, ‘Les trajectoires d’industrialisation au Maroc: 
une mise en perspective historique’, Document de travail 2 (2013).
11   Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andew Galbraith Carey, ‘The Two Developing Worlds of Morocco: A case 
study in economic development and planning’, Middle East Journal (1962), pp. 457–75; Jean-Francois 
Clement and James Paul, ‘Morocco’s Bourgeoisie: Monarchy, state and owning class’, MERIP Middle East 
Report 142 (1986), pp. 13–17.
12   Clement and Paul, ‘Morocco’s Bourgeoisie’.
13   White, A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco.
14   Ibid.
15   Thomas Richter and Christian Steiner, ‘Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt: 
Insights into the sectoral transformations of a neo-patrimonial rentier state’, Third World Quarterly 29/5 
(2008), pp. 939–59.
16   John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983).
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panies, shipping companies, natural resources and heavy industries.17 During this period, 
Egypt attempted to build capital intensive industries using state planning to allocate eco-
nomic resources. While the private sector was initially permitted to keep operating in the 
1950s, nationalisation deepened in the early 1960s to include any private firm with twen-
ty-five employees or more.18 Egyptian trade during this period shifted as Egypt expanded 
its trade linkages with the Soviet Union and eastern European states, often through bilat-
eral trading agreements.19 
The Nasserite economic programme ran into difficulties in the late 1960 and in the 1970s 
and, under President Anwar el-Sadat, Egypt began a gradual economic liberalisation process 
that transformed the Egyptian economy.20
The North African Infitah and Shift to Export-led Development  
While Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco followed different routes after independence, toward 
the end of the century, all three converged on a strategy focused on global integration, 
the attraction of foreign direct investments, trade liberalisation and limiting the role of 
the state in the economy: policies that became known generally in the Arab world as 
the infitah (‘openness’ or ‘open door’) policies. These changes were partly driven by the 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that were signed between indebted countries 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s. By the 1990s, Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco were portrayed as the ‘success stories of the IMF’ in the region and beyond.21 
Across the three economies, any influences of import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) and state-led development were replaced with the language of promoting exports, 
trade liberalisation and the private sector as the new engine of growth and development. 
From an external trade perspective, the three countries adopted trade liberalisation, 
capital liberalisation and currency devaluations in order to remove the ‘distortions’ 
constraining firms from exploiting the country’s comparative advantage.22 To promote 
exports, states were encouraged by experts and international organisations to set-up 
export processing zones that offered incentives to private firms including tax holidays 
and special labour regimes.
These infitah policies in North Africa coincided with broader organisational shifts within 
the global economy and specifically, within the countries on the other side of the Medi-
terranean in Europe. 
17   K.V. Nagarajan, ‘Egypt’s Political Economy and the Downfall of the Mubarak Regime’, International 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3/10 (2013), pp. 22–39, Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat.
18   Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘Egypt’s infitah and the politics of US economic assistance’, Middle Eastern 
Studies 21/2 (1985), pp. 206–22.
19   John Waterbury, ‘The “Soft State” and the Open Door: Egypt’s Experience with Economic Liberaliza-
tion, 1974–1984’, Comparative Politics 18/1 (1985), pp. 65–83.
20   Ibid. 
21   Karen Pfeifer, ‘How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and even Egypt became IMF “Success Stories” in the 
1990s’, Middle East Report 210 (1999), pp. 23–7; Bradford Dillman, ‘The Political Economy of Structural 
Adjustment in Tunisia and Algeria’, The Journal of North African Studies 3/3 (1998), pp. 1–24.
22   Pfeifer, ‘How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and even Egypt became IMF “Success Stories” in the 1990s’.
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At the global level, relationships between developed and developing economies were 
beginning to shift away from the core-periphery relationship that had dominated earlier 
periods. This relationship centred on developing economies exporting raw materials to 
advanced economies, where transformative manufacturing activities took place. A new 
‘international division of labour’ began to emerge in the 1970s.23 This reflected structural 
shifts in the production regime, as firms became increasingly able to separate different 
parts of production and locate these to different sites, giving rise to a new more flexible 
production system.24 As a result, corporations based in the advanced economies started 
to divide their production activities between different locations and to outsource some 
activities to other firms while maintaining overall control of the production process. For 
some low-cost locations, these shifts provided an opportunity to attract labour-inten-
sive activities and to enter manufacturing value chains.25 These changes were reflected 
in important changes in global production and trade. For the United States, locations 
such as northern Mexico and east Asia became important spaces for the outsourcing and 
offshoring of labour-intensive activities. For the advanced economies in western Europe, 
locations such as Turkey, parts of central and eastern Europe, and North Africa emerged 
as ideal spaces for these economic activities as those regions provided substantially lower 
labour costs in addition to geographical proximity and logistics links. 
One of the early manifestations of these economic shifts in North Africa was the system of 
‘outward processing’ in the European textile and apparel industry. Considering the impor-
tance of the industry in terms of job creation and the growing competition from low-cost 
producers in Asia, European corporations faced the need to lower their production costs 
by tapping into a ready supply of low-wage workers, particularly for the labour-inten-
sive apparel production (contrary to the more capital-intensive textile production). As a 
result, these European economies, and other advanced economies, followed a controlled 
approach to the liberalisation of trade in textile and apparel. This approach allowed 
growing imports of these products within limits, while also aiming to control the source 
of fabrics and other inputs used in imported clothing items. 
North Africa was well placed to benefit from this outward processing regime. Proximity 
to Europe meant that fabrics and inputs could be quickly shipped to North Africa where 
they could be processed and then sent back to Europe. Tunisia and Morocco – unlike 
Egypt, which was less incorporated into the outward processing regime – became import-
ant outward processing locations for European textiles by offering incentives to apparel 
factories facilitating European imports of fabric and inputs. While German and French 
23   Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour: Structural 
Unemployment in Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980); Rhys Jenkins, ‘Divisions over the International Division of Labour’, 
Capital & Class 8/1 (1984), pp. 28–57.
24   Adam Tickell and Jaime Peck, ‘Accumulation, Regulation and the Geographies of Post-Fordism: 
Missing links in regulationist research’, Progress in Human Geography 16/2 (1992), pp. 190–218; Winfred 
Ruigrok and Rob Van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring: The Management of Dependencies in 
Rival Industrial Complexes (London: Routledge, 2013). 
25   Gary Gereffi, ‘Global Commodity Chains: New forms of coordination and control among nations and 
firms in international industries’, Competition & Change 1/4 (1996), pp. 427–39. 
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firms were the first European firms to use this system in the late 1970s and 1980s, firms 
from other countries followed suit in subsequent years: Italy, in the case of Tunisia, and 
Spain in the case of Morocco. As a result of this system, Tunisian and Moroccan exports of 
apparel to the EU increased rapidly while imports of fabrics and other inputs in the other 
direction increased simultaneously. In the case of Egypt, similar growth in exports to the 
EU took place, but often from inputs sourced from elsewhere, such as Turkey and Asia, or 
from Egyptian textiles. 
In addition to apparel, similar growth in manufactured exports to Europe took place in 
sectors such as electronics, automotive parts and components, and footwear. In addition 
to manufacturing, services exports experienced growth in some North African economies 
with activities such as call centres servicing the French market in the cases of Tunisia and 
Morocco, and the UK market in the case of Egypt. 
The Economic Results of Export-Oriented Industrialisation  
Export processing zones in North Africa became key manifestations of this new economic 
geography. These zones offered incentives related to taxation, tariffs and imported inputs, 
in addition to limiting restrictions on capital flows and repatriated profits. In Tunisia, for 
example, the ‘offshore regime’ that was put in place as early as 1972 provided exporting 
firms with tax exemptions from company tax, tariffs on imported inputs and machinery, 
lower income tax for foreign staff employed in these companies and no restrictions on 
repatriation of profits.26 The majority of these zones were located near Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco’s coastal areas with easy access to ports. Locations included Alexandria, Port 
Said and Cairo in Egypt, Sfax, Monstair, Sousse, Tunis and Bizerte in Tunisia, and Tangier, 
Casablanca, Fes and Kneitra in Morocco (see Figure 1).
26   Charlotte Jacobson and Sara Lindberg, ‘An Evaluation of the Offshore Regime in Tunisia’, Lund Uni-
versity Student Papers (2005). Available at http:/lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1337697 (accessed 3 
September 2020).
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Figure 1: Key Industrial/Export Processing Zones in North Africa
Source: Compiled by the authors 
In terms of overall performance, the strategy of export-oriented industrialisation adopted 
in the three North African economies had positive impacts in terms of growth in exports, 
especially in the manufacturing sector (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Manufacturing Exports of Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, US$ million 
Source: UN Comtrade
As a result, important changes in the structure of the exports of the North African econo-
mies took place, with a rapid increase in the share of manufactured goods in total exports, 
compared to elsewhere in Africa (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Share of Manufacturing in Total Exports, 2015 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDIO) 
Structural Fragility in North Africa’s Development Model
The export-oriented strategy resulted in the growing share of trade in the three economies 
and their reorientation from exporters of raw materials and agricultural products into 
manufacturing locations for exports to Europe. As discussed in the previous section, this 
strategy brought a number of economic benefits in terms of expanding the manufacturing 
sector and increasing the share of manufacturing in total exports.
Yet despite this relative success, the strategy has not succeeded in creating dynamic econ-
omies capable of producing sustainable economic and social development. The reliance 
on low cost labour as the main comparative advantage and the dependency on the EU 
in terms of market access, technological capabilities, capital, and value chain capabili-
ties placed the three economies in a structurally fragile position in terms of their future 
development. In the earlier period of export-oriented development, a large source of this 
fragility was the lack of predictability about market access to the EU. In 1977, for instance, 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia all faced quantitative restrictions on their textile exports 
to the EU.27 Despite higher certainty of market access as a result of stronger free trade 
agreements with the EU, dependency on Europe remained a source of structural fragil-
ity of their export-oriented development strategy. This dependency has been one of the 
drivers for Morocco and Egypt to seek stronger economic relations with the US. This has 
included a free trade agreement (FTA) between Morocco and the US, as well as a prefer-
ential market access agreement, known as the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ), between 
Egypt and the US. Nonetheless, other geopolitical factors were also key in the making of 
these agreements.28 We first outline the sources of this fragility and then discuss some of 
its manifestations.
27   Richard Pomfret, ‘Protectionism and Preferences in the European Community’s Mediterranean 
Policy’, The World Today 38/2 (1982), pp. 60–5.
28   Shamel Azmeh, ‘Trade Regimes and Global Production Networks: The case of the qualifying industrial 
zones (QIZs) in Egypt and Jordan’, Geoforum 57 (2014), pp. 57–66. Gregory White, ‘Free Trade as a Stra-
tegic Instrument in the War on Terror?: The 2004 US-Moroccan free trade agreement’ The Middle East 
Journal 59/4 (2005), pp. 597–616. 
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Structural Fragility in the North African Economies
The dependency on the European market, particularly in the case of Tunisia and Morocco, 
is understandable to a degree. The EU is one of the largest consumer markets in the world 
and the three North African economies enjoy important advantages in it in terms of prox-
imity, market access and business linkages. 
Nonetheless, the high level of dependency on the EU is a source of fragility. By 2008, 
the EU accounted for 60% of Moroccan exports and 72% of Tunisian exports. Egypt’s 
exports were more diversified, but the EU was still by far the top export destination 
for Egypt, accounting for a third of the total. Importantly, within the EU, there is a high 
level of dependency on specific markets. For Morocco, two countries alone – France and 
Spain – accounted for 65% of exports to Europe, while the top five European destinations 
accounted for 84%. For Tunisia, again just two countries – France and Italy – accounted for 
68% of their exports to Europe, while the top five destinations accounting for 91%. Egypt 
had a relatively more diversified pattern with Italy and the Netherlands accounting for 
45% of total exports to Europe, and the top five destinations together accounting for 80%. 
In particular, all three were heavily dependent on Spain, Italy, and France, who together 
accounted for 54% of Egyptian exports to Europe (and 19% of their worldwide total), 72% 
of Moroccan exports to Europe (42% to the world), and 75% of Tunisian exports to Europe 
(54% to the world). 
Over recent decades, this fragility was illustrated as the three North African economies 
were affected by economic shifts in Europe and changes in the external policy of the EU. 
Economic Changes in Europe and the Enlargement of the EU
In recent decades, Europe has experienced important geo-economic changes, including 
the end of the Cold War and the enlargement of the EU. These factors had important 
economic implications for the North African economies as they led to shifts in trade and 
capital flows for key EU partners. The integration of former socialist eastern European 
economies into a Western economic model had important implications for the outsourc-
ing processes described earlier, as it opened up new low-cost spaces for western European 
firms to invest in or outsource to. Similarly, successive waves of EU enlargement had 
similar effects on trade and investments. Freedom of movement within the EU lowered 
the cost of labour for western European firms and locations such as Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, among others, became attractive locations for German invest-
ments. These shifts, however, were not permanent as multiple factors affected decisions 
to relocate and invest. The initial cost advantage of some eastern European economies, 
for example, was eventually exhausted either by their integration into the single currency 
‘Eurozone’ or as a result of the gradual convergence of wages with the rest of Europe, as a 
result of migration outflows and capital inflows. 
For countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, which had been reliant on Europe for 
decades without being part of the EU – ‘on the outside looking in’ as Gregory White puts 
it29 – these shifts forced them to react and adapt to the changing calculus of European 
firms, whether investors or buyers. 
29   White, A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco.
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Some of these impacts can be seen at specific points in certain industries. With automo-
tives, for example, the German industry passed through a phase of restructuring in the 
1980s. Part of this involved the outsourcing of wage-sensitive and labour-intensive com-
ponent production to lower-cost locations. One such component was wiring harnesses. 
Tunisia and Morocco started to attract some investment in this area due to their low 
labour costs, their proximity to Europe and their favourable trade policy environment. 
The opening of eastern European economies in the early 1990s, however, provided new 
highly competitive locations. While North African exports grew at a modest rate, rapid 
growth in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s took place in eastern Europe, especially 
in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Nonetheless, as those economies 
joined the EU – driving their wages up – production in eastern Europe declined, and 
was accompanied by an expansion in North African exports from Morocco, Egypt and 
Tunisia (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: German Imports of Wiring Harness, US$ million 
Source: UN Comtrade 
Changes in European Trade Policy
From a trade policy perspective, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt all enjoy privileged posi-
tions regarding access to Europe. When all three North African economies obtained their 
duty-free access to the European market, very few other countries in the world enjoyed 
the same, while average tariff rates across Europe were relatively high. In recent decades, 
however, this privileged position has been eroded by a number of factors. Firstly, the 
general rate of tariffs levied by the EU on imports have declined. Between 1990 and 2017, 
the weighted mean of applied tariffs imposed by the EU declined from 4.8% to 1.79% 
(according to the World Bank). Despite this overall decline, preferential market access to 
the EU remains an important advantage as tariffs, and other non-tariff barriers, are still 
high on specific products. 
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In addition, the number of other countries enjoying similar market access has increased. 
For decades, the EU, similar to other advanced economies, offered preferential access 
to its market either via reciprocal free trade agreements or non-reciprocal preferences 
programs such as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). In recent years, a growing 
number of countries have enjoyed such access. The EU has reached a number of free 
trade agreements with partners such as Vietnam, which compete with North Africa in 
sectors such as apparel and electronics. Furthermore, through the Everything but Arms 
(EBA) initiative that entered into force in 2001, the EU has offered duty-free access to 
some of the least developed countries (LDCs). As a result, countries such as Bangladesh 
now enjoy duty-free access to the European market with arguably fewer conditions than 
Europe’s North African partners, as the latter have to comply with rules of origin require-
ments (RoOs). A common complaint by North African apparel firms today, for example, 
is that they are forced to use expensive European and Turkish fabrics in their exports, as 
a result of RoOs, while their Asian competitors can use cheaper Indian or Chinese fabrics. 
In recent years, the share of North African exports in the EU apparel market has declined 
vis-à-vis the share of Asian exporters such as Bangladesh. Another example is the shift in 
EU imports and investment that followed the implementation of a customs union with 
Turkey in 1996. 
Through these changes, the three North African economies have lost in recent years, to a 
degree, their positions as ‘privileged partners’ of the EU. 
The Economic Crisis of 2008 and its Aftermath
This North African structural fragility was further revealed followed the global economic 
crisis of 2008, and particularly the subsequent European debt crisis. While the global 
economy as a whole suffered from the crisis, key European Mediterranean trading part-
ners such as Italy, France and Spain were particularly affected. After positive GDP growth 
in previous years, these large western European economies experienced substantial eco-
nomic shrinking in the period 2009–13, especially Italy and Spain (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: GDP Growth Rates of North Africa’s Key Mediterranean Partners 
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This decline had important impacts on their trading partners. From 2008 to 2013, the 
total imports of France, Spain and Italy declined by 18.2%. For North African economies, 
2008–9 saw a sharp drop in exports to Mediterranean partners, with exports to those 
countries declining by 22.6% for Egypt, 18.2% for Morocco and 19% for Tunisia. 
The Implications of Structural Fragility in the North African Economies
The structural fragility caused by dependency on the EU and low-cost labour as a source 
of comparative advantage has had important wider implications for the economies of 
North Africa.
Despite an expansion in manufactured exports, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have all largely 
failed to upgrade their position in European production networks and have remained spe-
cialised in cost-sensitive low-technology and low value-added products. The majority of 
firms exporting to Europe from the region are dependent on their European partners for 
designs, key technologies, working capital and sourcing of inputs. Such reliance weakens 
the ability of those firms to generate more value and to show higher resilience vis-à-vis the 
shifts in the behaviour of European firms.  
North African economies have further struggled to create domestic or regional linkages 
between foreign investment and domestic markets and supply chains. Unlike East Asia, 
where regional production networks underpin the position of the region in the global 
economy, North African economies have developed much weaker regional trade and 
production networks due to their reliance on European patterns for sourcing of com-
ponents and due to the significant logistical barriers that still limit regional trade within 
North Africa. In fact, in some cases, the regulatory regimes under which the export sector 
was created, such as the offshore regime in Tunisia, have hindered the ability to create 
domestic linkages by creating barriers to trade between the exporting sector and the rest 
of the economy. From the perspective of European firms, the North African economies 
represent alternative production locations rather than a complementary or integrated 
economic zone. 
As a result of this reliance on European firms, their lack of capability and the limited 
extent of regional networks, North African firms continue to occupy a fragile position in 
their production networks, leaving them vulnerable to shifts in European trade policy and 
sourcing and investment strategies of European firms. Similarly, due to their reliance on 
low-cost labour and their limited technological capabilities, these firms are vulnerable to 
technological changes in their industries. Today, for example, the expansion of automa-
tion in manufacturing places economies that are solely reliant on their low labour costs in 
a risky position.30 Furthermore, the three North African economies, with the exception of 
recent developments in Morocco that we will discuss shortly, have not been successful in 
attracting economic activities that require longer term commitments in terms of capital 
investment, with these often entailing higher levels of technological capabilities and facil-
itating the ability to build domestic and regional linkages. 
30   Dani Rodrik, ‘New technologies, Global Value Chains, and Developing Economies’, National Bureau of 
Economic Research No. w25164 (2018). 
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As a result of these dynamics, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have all struggled to increase 
the value-added in their exports and to diversify beyond being processing and assembly 
platforms for the EU. In fact, some indicators suggest that the share of domestic val-
ue-added in the exports of some of the important sectors in North Africa has declined 
in recent years. In electrical equipment, for instance, the share of domestic value-added 
in Tunisian exports declined from 58.4% in 2005 to 51.1% in 2016, while Morocco expe-
rienced a decline from 62.8% to 57.5% (according to the OECD-WTO trade in value 
added database).31 At a macro level, the failure to expand, diversify, and increase the 
value-added in exports resulted in a widening trade deficit in goods starting in the mid-
2000s (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Net Trade in Goods, US$ billion 
Source: World Bank
Another result of this mode of shallow export-oriented development has been the failure 
to expand the economic benefits of export-oriented industry beyond the coastal pockets 
of the industrial zones. This concentration has resulted in widening gaps between these 
regions and the interior in terms of employment and wages. Some of these gaps date 
back to previous historical periods, including the changing economic geographies of 
these economies during and before colonialism. The export-oriented strategies adopted 
in recent decades have reinforced and, in some cases, expanded those gaps, with unem-
ployment and poverty rates in the interior governorates substantially higher than those in 
coastal regions.32 
31   Data for Egypt is not provided in this database. 
32   Larbi Sadiki, ‘Regional Development in Tunisia: The Consequences of Multiple Marginalization’, 
Brookings Doha Centre Report (2019). 
-35,000
-30,000
-25,000
-20,000
-15,000
-10,000
-5,000
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Egypt Tunisia Morocco
20 North Africa’s Export Economies and Structural Fragility
The Arab Spring and the Search for New Routes for Development 
The three North African economies were at the heart of the protest movement that swept 
the Arab world in 2011, which became known as the Arab Spring. While Egypt and Tunisia 
received more media attention as a result of large-scale protests that led to the ousting of 
their presidents, Morocco also experienced widespread upheaval during 2011 and 2012.33 
In all three countries, political and economic issues were intertwined as driving factors of 
these movements. During this period, while media attention was focused on the capital 
cities, protests and strikes also took place in other parts of the country. These included 
the underdeveloped interior regions, including small towns and rural areas where issues 
such as unemployment and poverty were key. It also included locations important for the 
export sector, such as the industrial zones and associated logistical infrastructure, where 
mobilisation of workers through strikes and protests took place. Mobilisation of workers 
in those areas preceded the 2011 protests and continued in subsequent years. 
Maha Abdelrahman argues that it is difficult to separate and prioritise demands around 
political rights from economic issues in these protest movements.34 While true, the protest 
movements can be seen partially as outcome of the exhaustion of the economic develop-
ment model adopted in the three countries in previous decades. In particular, the protest 
movements reflected the inability to expand processes of industrialisation beyond the 
coastal regions, the failure to achieve economic and social upgrading in production net-
works, and the structural fragility of these networks, as illustrated by the impact of the 
global economic crisis and the European debt crisis. This fragility was illustrated with the 
impact of the protest movement and the subsequent political instability on the position 
of those economies in European-dominated production networks. In the crucial apparel 
sector, for instance, Tunisian exports to Europe declined from US$3.7 billion in 2008 to 
US$2.1 billion by 2016. In addition to the protest movement and the general political insta-
bility, the 2015 terrorist attack in Sousse, an important export location, created difficulties 
for Tunisian firms in terms of their relationships with European buyers. 
In subsequent years, there was a significant divergence between the economic perfor-
mance of Morocco on the one hand and Egypt and Tunisia on the other hand, particularly 
in relation to foreign investments and the position of these economies in global networks 
of production. For Egypt and Tunisia, deepening political instability further limited their 
ability to move beyond reliance on low-cost labour as a source of competitiveness. As 
orders from buyers declined and foreign investment into manufacturing slowed down, 
the two economies resorted to devaluation as a strategy to increase exports and limit 
widening trade deficits. Those devaluations, in turn, contributed to sharp increases in the 
inflation rate and thus further contributed to political unrest. Between 2009 and 2017, 
Egypt experienced double-digit consumer price inflation in seven years including a rate 
33   Koenraad Bogaert, ‘The Revolt of Small Towns: The meaning of Morocco’s history and the geography 
of social protests’, Review of African Political Economy 42/143 (2015), pp. 124–40
34   Maha Abdelrahman, ‘A Hierarchy of Struggles? The “economic” and the “political” in Egypt’s revolu-
tion’, Review of African Political Economy 39/134 (2012), pp. 614–28
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that was higher than 29% in 2017. While lower than Egypt, Tunisia has also experienced 
high inflation rates in recent years. 
Morocco, however, was able to escape a similar fate of downward competitiveness 
pressure. Buoyed by its image as the ‘stable country in North Africa’ amongst foreign 
firms, it emerged as an increasingly attractive location in the region. In a number of 
industries, Morocco has succeeded in strengthening its position and attracting foreign 
direct investment in recent years, particularly in the automotive industry with assem-
bly plants for Renault, Peugeot and Ford. Such activities entail long-term commitment 
by the investing firms, as assembly factories have long capital payback periods. This 
success has also been attributed to the more sophisticated industrial policy Morocco 
had adopted in recent years.35 
The relationship with the EU remains the key economic issue facing the three economies. 
While the share of EU destinations in each’s total exports declined following the global 
economic crisis, the European debt crisis and the Arab Spring, this share has started to 
rise again in the last few years, although it is yet to return to 2007 levels. At the same 
time, further integration with the EU is on the table through the Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agenda. The DCFTAs aim to update the existing free trade 
agreements between the EU and North Africa and to focus on issues such as regulatory 
harmonisation. However, negotiations with Egypt and Morocco for DCFTAs have been 
paused, for various reasons, while they are still ongoing with Tunisia. 
Conclusions 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt have been amongst the early adopters of free trade poli-
cies in the developing world, with the aim of boosting economic development through 
export-oriented industrialisation and their integration in global value chains. Benefitting 
from factors such as proximity and linkages to the European market and preferential 
access to it, these three North African economies, especially Tunisia and Morocco, have 
developed into low-cost export processing platforms for the EU economy by attracting 
labour-intensive activities in sectors such as apparel and electronic equipment. This 
strategy has succeeded in boosting the manufacturing exports of these economies and 
in achieving a degree of industrialisation. Nevertheless, we argue that the reliance on 
low-cost labour as a source of competitive advantage, in addition to the weak position 
of those economies and their firms in European value chains, has left these economies 
in a structurally fragile position. This fragility was illustrated in recent years following 
the global economic crisis and the European debt crisis on one hand, and the protest 
movements of the Arab Spring on the other. The low-cost platform model was exhaust-
ing itself with the changing dynamics in the EU economy as well as in the North African 
economies in question. 
35   Auktor Georgeta Vidican and Tina Hahn, ‘The Effectiveness of Morocco’s Industrial Policy in Promoting 
a National Automotive Industry’, German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
Discussion Paper 27 (2017).
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In the wake of the Arab Spring, the three economies have struggled to meet growing inter-
nal political and economic demands within the limits of their export-oriented model of 
development. The governments of Tunisia and Egypt have pursued a devaluation path to 
encourage competitiveness, increasing domestic unrest. Morocco, on the other hand, has 
managed to boost its economic upgrading by strengthening its position in European net-
works of production, benefitting from its relative political stability and more sophisticated 
industrial policy. 
The search for alternative models of development is taking place in a rapidly chang-
ing international political economy. The rise of protectionism in some of the advanced 
economies, questions surrounding the future of the international trading regime, and the 
expansion of automation in manufacturing, all raise important challenges for the future of 
the economies of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.
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